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Abstract	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠerradicating	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠare	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Indonesia	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ decisions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠyear	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠto	 ﾠyear	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠset	 ﾠcomprises	 ﾠof	 ﾠ549	 ﾠ cases	 ﾠ
involving	 ﾠ831	 ﾠdefendants.	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠSuharto’s	 ﾠregime,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnti	 ﾠCorruption	 ﾠBill	 ﾠwas	 ﾠratified	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1999	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠrefined	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2001.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmanifested	 ﾠby	 ﾠstating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBill.	 ﾠDespite	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
punishments	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠtypes,	 ﾠjudges’	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishments	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
defendants	 ﾠare	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠconsistent.	 ﾠUsing	 ﾠlogistic	 ﾠregressions,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
sentencing	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishments	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠfines,	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseizure	 ﾠof	 ﾠevidence)	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendants.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjudges’	 ﾠ
decisions	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlenient	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠwith	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠoccupations	 ﾠbut	 ﾠharsher	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
others.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishments	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠidiosyncratically	 ﾠand	 ﾠhas	 ﾠweakened	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeterrence	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpunishments.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠestimating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption,	 ﾠprosecutors	 ﾠhave	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
explicit	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption,	 ﾠ therefore	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ impact	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Indonesia	 ﾠ economy	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ
underestimated.	 ﾠ Brand	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Price	 ﾠ (2000)	 ﾠ defined	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ crime	 ﾠ includes	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
anticipation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠin	 ﾠreaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠto	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠwas	 ﾠRp	 ﾠ73.1	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ(about	 ﾠUS	 ﾠ$8.49	 ﾠbillion),	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
punishment	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠwas	 ﾠRp	 ﾠ5.33	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ(about	 ﾠUS$619.77	 ﾠmillion).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠshow	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ mostly	 ﾠ committed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ medium-ﾭ‐high	 ﾠ income	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ usually	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ good	 ﾠ
careers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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1.	 ﾠIntroduction	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeterrence	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠliterature,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
severity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ punishment	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ effective	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ deterring	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ committing	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ offence.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
assumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠoffender	 ﾠis	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommitting	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠchoice.	 ﾠ
Individuals	 ﾠare	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠcommit	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠexceed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
expected	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffending.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeter	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcommitting	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
offence,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ authority	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ expected	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ offending	 ﾠ bourned	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ
offenders.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠanalyse	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠ
commit	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeter	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcommitting	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠargued	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ severity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ punishment	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ matter	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ deterring	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ committing	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
offence.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠpionerred	 ﾠby	 ﾠBecker,	 ﾠ1968	 ﾠand	 ﾠexcellent	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠsurveys	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
area	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠby	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠGaroupa	 ﾠ(1997),	 ﾠEide	 ﾠ(2000,	 ﾠ2004),	 ﾠ
Bowles	 ﾠ(2000)	 ﾠand	 ﾠPolinsky	 ﾠand	 ﾠShavell	 ﾠ(2000,	 ﾠ2007).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠother	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠgame	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠin	 ﾠanalysing	 ﾠphenomena	 ﾠin	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠ
justice.	 ﾠTsebelis	 ﾠ(1989,	 ﾠ1991,	 ﾠ1993)	 ﾠpionereed	 ﾠin	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠand	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
attempt	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ severity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ punishment	 ﾠ reduced	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ probability	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ criminal	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ
authority	 ﾠin	 ﾠenforcing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠoffending.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠcounter	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠresult	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠa	 ﾠlong	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠBianco	 ﾠ
(1990),	 ﾠOrdeshook	 ﾠ(1990),	 ﾠWeissing	 ﾠand	 ﾠOstrom	 ﾠ(1991),	 ﾠHirshleifer	 ﾠand	 ﾠRasmusen	 ﾠ(1992)	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠAndreozzi	 ﾠ(2004).	 ﾠPradiptyo	 ﾠ(2007)	 ﾠrefined	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinspection	 ﾠgame	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠTsebelis	 ﾠ
(1989)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠshowed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠso	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠdiscrepancy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠ
theory	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ game	 ﾠ theoretical	 ﾠ approaches.	 ﾠ Pradiptyo	 ﾠ (2007)	 ﾠ showed	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ attempt	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseverity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠis	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffending	 ﾠif	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
conditions	 ﾠhold.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠproved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠprevention	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
reducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffending	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseverity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Attempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffending	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠin	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠways.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
criminal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠmay	 ﾠendeavour	 ﾠeither	 ﾠto	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠdetection,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
alternatively,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseverity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment.	 ﾠIndeed	 ﾠboth	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠscenarios	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
costly.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ achieve	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ optimum	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ deterrence,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ criminal	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ
authority	 ﾠhas	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠscenarios	 ﾠeither	 ﾠby	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠlow	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠdetection	 ﾠcombined	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠor	 ﾠby	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠdetection	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlow	 ﾠ
intensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠas	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠabove	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠeradicating	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠAny	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
corruptor	 ﾠis	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccordingly	 ﾠthey	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠcosts-ﾭ‐benefits	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠprior	 ﾠto	 ﾠcommit	 ﾠ
corruption.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffences,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdivided	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠ several	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ instance	 ﾠ small,	 ﾠ medium	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ scales	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ
classification	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠmisallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠresources	 ﾠowing	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcorruptors,	 ﾠranging	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
imprisonment,	 ﾠfines,	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠorder	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseizure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠillegitimate	 ﾠassets.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠ
countries,	 ﾠcorruptors	 ﾠmay	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠpunishment.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠideal	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcorruption,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruptors	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠharsher	 ﾠpunishments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeterrence	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠattention	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠbuilds	 ﾠreputation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
criminal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠextent	 ﾠis	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeterrence	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠact	 ﾠ
imposed.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtype	 ﾠand	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishments	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpenal	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠembraced	 ﾠacross	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠ
uses	 ﾠ549	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠ831	 ﾠdefendants,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2001-ﾭ‐2009.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠcases	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠwebsite	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠin	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠURL:	 ﾠhttp://putusan	 ﾠ.mahkamahagung.go.id.	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠCorruption	 ﾠErradication	 ﾠProgrammes	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠ
Various	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGovernment	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠ(GoI)	 ﾠto	 ﾠtackle	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ
Back	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1950s,	 ﾠduring	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠSoekarno’s	 ﾠera,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGoI	 ﾠhad	 ﾠlaunched	 ﾠa	 ﾠprogramme	 ﾠto	 ﾠtackle	 ﾠ
corruption.	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠSuharto’s	 ﾠera	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1970s	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠmid	 ﾠ1990s,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGoI	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
launched	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠto	 ﾠeradicate	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠNevertheless	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffectiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
programmes	 ﾠwas	 ﾠquestioned	 ﾠas	 ﾠboth	 ﾠpresidents	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠembrace	 ﾠabsolute	 ﾠpower,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtend	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcorrupt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
After	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠSuharto	 ﾠstepped	 ﾠdown	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1998,	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠundergoing	 ﾠreformations	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠpolitic,	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠand	 ﾠlaw.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreformations	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ abolish	 ﾠ corruption,	 ﾠ collusions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ nepotism,	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ flourished	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Suharto’s	 ﾠregime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Several	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠcombat	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ1999,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanti	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
act	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ ratified	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ refined	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ year	 ﾠ 2001	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ summary	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Appendix	 ﾠ A).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ 2002	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠ eradication	 ﾠ committee	 ﾠ (KPK)	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ formed	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ institution	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ fully	 ﾠ
functioned	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ2004.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ2003,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoney-ﾭ‐laundering	 ﾠact	 ﾠwas	 ﾠratified	 ﾠand	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠact	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformation	 ﾠof	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠTransaction	 ﾠReport	 ﾠAnalysis	 ﾠCentre	 ﾠ(PPATK),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠserves	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠ investigative	 ﾠ unit	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Indonesia.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ PPATK	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ fully	 ﾠ functioned	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ 2005.	 ﾠ
Recently,	 ﾠin	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamendments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠlaundering	 ﾠact	 ﾠwas	 ﾠratified	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠ basis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ link	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ PPATK	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ criminal	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ agencies,	 ﾠ























Figure	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠVarious	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠin	 ﾠcombating	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠpreventive	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠby	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠservants	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitiation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠbureaucratic	 ﾠ
reformation	 ﾠ programmes	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ 2003.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ programme	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ initiated	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMinistry	 ﾠof	 ﾠFinance.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprogramme	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠimprovement	 ﾠon	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠ
servant	 ﾠsalary	 ﾠbut	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠof	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠservant	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
promoted.	 ﾠCurrently,	 ﾠmost	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠhave	 ﾠembraced	 ﾠbureaucratic	 ﾠreformation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
Indonesia	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDutch	 ﾠsince	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠera.	 ﾠCriminal	 ﾠ
Code	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠ(KUHP)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdeclared	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
independent	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ1945,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠits	 ﾠpenal	 ﾠcode	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDutch	 ﾠCriminal	 ﾠCode	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1811	 ﾠ
(Wetboek	 ﾠ van	 ﾠ Strafrecht).	 ﾠ Ironically,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Dutch	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ longer	 ﾠ implement	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ code	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ
embraced	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠcode	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ1979.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Corruption	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠextra	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
tackle	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠby	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠanti	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠanti	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠact	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠractified	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
1999,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠrefined	 ﾠin2001.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠessence,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠlaws	 ﾠare	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠCriminal	 ﾠCode	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠ
(KUHP)	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDutch	 ﾠCriminal	 ﾠCode	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1811	 ﾠ(Wetboek	 ﾠvan	 ﾠStrafrecht)	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
longer3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠKPK	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠbody	 ﾠfinanced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtask	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠKPK	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠto	 ﾠeradicate	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠseems	 ﾠKPK	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠmay	 ﾠoverlap	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
police	 ﾠand	 ﾠprosecutors,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠKPK	 ﾠdeals	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠscale	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠcases	 ﾠ(i.e,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠRp1	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ(US$	 ﾠ116,279).	 ﾠBelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthreshold,	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
cases	 ﾠis	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdealt	 ﾠby	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠprosecutors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠComplexity	 ﾠof	 ﾠCorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠby	 ﾠHong	 ﾠKong-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠ&	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠRisk	 ﾠConsultancy	 ﾠLtd	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠ
Indonesia	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcorrupt	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠin	 ﾠAsia-ﾭ‐Pacific	 ﾠregion.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠturns	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠacute	 ﾠthen	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠCambodia,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Philipines,	 ﾠIndia,	 ﾠThailand	 ﾠand	 ﾠVietnam.	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCorruption	 ﾠPerception	 ﾠIndex	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTransparency	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ110th	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠ178	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Question	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠraised	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠserious	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia.	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ
shows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠmay	 ﾠstart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
stage	 ﾠ1	 ﾠwhereby	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠ(either	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
corruption).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstage,	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠinteract	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠby	 ﾠplaying	 ﾠan	 ﾠinspection	 ﾠ
game.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠstrategies,	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠoffence,	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3For	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠfines	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠCriminal	 ﾠCode	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠoffences	 ﾠmay	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrange	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠhundreds	 ﾠrupiah,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠneglible	 ﾠin	 ﾠterm	 ﾠof	 ﾠvalue.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnti	 ﾠCorruption	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ20/2001,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfines	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠadjusted	 ﾠto	 ﾠyear	 ﾠ2000	 ﾠvalues,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠfines	 ﾠis	 ﾠRp	 ﾠ1	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠor	 ﾠapproximately	 ﾠUS	 ﾠ$	 ﾠ100,000.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
whereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicemen	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠstrategies,	 ﾠinspect	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinspect.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgame	 ﾠis	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠby	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠagent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Figure	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠModelling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠ
Suppose	 ﾠin	 ﾠStage	 ﾠ1	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠcommits	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠinspects,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠis	 ﾠcaught.	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠis	 ﾠcaught,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgame	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStage	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstage,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠshould	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠto	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠprosecutors.	 ﾠPrior	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
processing	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffender	 ﾠmay	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠor	 ﾠalternatively	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorrupt	 ﾠ
policeman	 ﾠmay	 ﾠextort	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendant.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstage,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠparties	 ﾠmay	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
bargaining	 ﾠ process.	 ﾠ Stage	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ modelled	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ police	 ﾠ officers.	 ﾠ Bowles	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Garoupa	 ﾠ
(2005)	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠand	 ﾠexcellent	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠmodelling	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠare	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbargaining.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbargaining	 ﾠis	 ﾠagreed,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠ opportunity	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ policeman	 ﾠ stop	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ process	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ investigation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ decide	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
record	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnother	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbargaining	 ﾠis	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
continue	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ process	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ refer	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ prosecutors	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ lower	 ﾠ gravity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
offending	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ weaker	 ﾠ evidence.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ occur	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ
profile	 ﾠ whereby	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ press	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ reported	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ media.	 ﾠ Nevertheless,	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ policeman	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
righteous	 ﾠperson,	 ﾠany	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠmay	 ﾠadversely	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
offenders.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreferral	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprosecutors,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoliceman	 ﾠmay	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ
offenders	 ﾠattempted	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠto	 ﾠhim/her.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠscenario	 ﾠoccurs,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
prosecuted	 ﾠmore	 ﾠseverely	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprosecuted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠharder	 ﾠpunishments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Stage	 ﾠ3	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠprosecutors	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudges.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstage,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
defendants	 ﾠmay	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠto	 ﾠprosecutors	 ﾠand	 ﾠor	 ﾠjudges.	 ﾠAlternatively,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprosecutors	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
judges	 ﾠmay	 ﾠextort	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdefendants.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
plenty	 ﾠroom	 ﾠof	 ﾠmanoeuvre	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprosecutors	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠto	 ﾠextort	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdefendants.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠacts	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsince	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcompulsory	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
act	 ﾠstates	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠviolate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlaw.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠact	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
2004	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠfines	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠworth	 ﾠRp100	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠrupiah.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
hand,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanti	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠact	 ﾠstated	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠfines	 ﾠworth	 ﾠonly	 ﾠRp1	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠrupiah.	 ﾠ
Obviously	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠsome	 ﾠacts	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠprosecutors	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠto	 ﾠextort	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠin	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharges	 ﾠwith	 ﾠless	 ﾠ
intensive	 ﾠpunishments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Similar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠat	 ﾠstage	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠbargaining	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠin	 ﾠstage	 ﾠ3	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
amount	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠbribed	 ﾠor	 ﾠextorted	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourt.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbargaining	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠagreed,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendant	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcharged	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnot	 ﾠguilty	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendant	 ﾠis	 ﾠfound	 ﾠguilty	 ﾠ
he/she	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ receive	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ intensive	 ﾠ punishment.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Nevertheless,	 ﾠ bribing	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ uncertain	 ﾠ
business	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendant	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠprosecutors	 ﾠor	 ﾠjudges.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprosecutors	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ judges	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ righteous	 ﾠ individuals,	 ﾠ then	 ﾠ offering	 ﾠ bribe	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
intensive	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendants.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠonly	 ﾠat	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠcourts,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠin	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourts.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourts.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
Indonesia’s	 ﾠpenal	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠare	 ﾠguilty	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
intensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠis	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjudges.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠjury	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠ
system.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠto	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠis	 ﾠparamount	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
tremendous	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠare	 ﾠguilty	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
right	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtype	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠstage,	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠby	 ﾠofficers	 ﾠin	 ﾠprisons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
committed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ prison	 ﾠ ranging	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ asking	 ﾠ money	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ family	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ offenders	 ﾠ during	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
scheduled	 ﾠvisits	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠto	 ﾠspend	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠnights	 ﾠto	 ﾠstay	 ﾠat	 ﾠhome	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ
family.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfamous	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠprison	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia.	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Artalita	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠto	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠprison	 ﾠofficers	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠher	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠher	 ﾠown	 ﾠfive	 ﾠstar	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
spacious	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠroom	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprison	 ﾠarea.	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠanother	 ﾠspacious	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
organising	 ﾠmonthly	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠwith	 ﾠher	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠto	 ﾠrun	 ﾠher	 ﾠmulti	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠbusinesses.	 ﾠSecondly	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
case	 ﾠof	 ﾠGayus	 ﾠTambunan,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠto	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠprison	 ﾠofficers	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠon	 ﾠholiday	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠHongkong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhis	 ﾠwife	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠwatch	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠtennis	 ﾠmatch	 ﾠin	 ﾠBali.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ complexity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Indonesia	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ paramount	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ consideration	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ taken	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
existence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ markus	 ﾠ	 ﾠor	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ broker	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ every	 ﾠ single	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ criminal	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ authority	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
Indonesia.	 ﾠMarkus	 ﾠis	 ﾠstand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmakelar	 ﾠkasus	 ﾠ(makelar	 ﾠis	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDutch	 ﾠword	 ﾠmakelaar	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
mean	 ﾠbroker,	 ﾠand	 ﾠkasus	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠmarkus	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠbroker).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmarkuses	 ﾠexist	 ﾠin	 ﾠevery	 ﾠ
single	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmarkus	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
criminal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠofficer,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠanybody	 ﾠas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperson	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
officers	 ﾠin	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroker,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarkus	 ﾠworks	 ﾠby	 ﾠintermediating	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
defendants	 ﾠand	 ﾠofficers	 ﾠin	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarkus	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠ
due	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠin	 ﾠbribery	 ﾠand	 ﾠextortion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
party.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmarkus	 ﾠserves	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintermediary	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠboth	 ﾠparties	 ﾠto	 ﾠsmooth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠerror	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠI	 ﾠand	 ﾠII	 ﾠin	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠbribery	 ﾠor	 ﾠasking	 ﾠfor	 ﾠextortion.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
markus	 ﾠis	 ﾠparamount	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGoI	 ﾠhas	 ﾠformed	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠtask	 ﾠforce	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcracking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarkus	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠauthority.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠJudicial	 ﾠSystem	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠ
Under	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠall	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠcases	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrialled	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠDistrict	 ﾠ
courts.	 ﾠEach	 ﾠDistrict	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠis	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠKabupaten	 ﾠ(district)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠ502	 ﾠdistricts	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Indonesia.	 ﾠ Judges’	 ﾠ decisions	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ district	 ﾠ court	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ appealed	 ﾠ either	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ defendants	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
prosecutors	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdissatisfied	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendant	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
appeal,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠin	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠis	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcourt,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠprovince.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendant	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
satisfy	 ﾠwith	 ﾠjudges’	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠcourt,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠ
court.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprosecutor	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠwith	 ﾠjudges’	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDistrict	 ﾠ
court,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠappeald	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
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Figure	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠAppeal	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠCriminal	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠSystem	 ﾠ
After	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠan	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconducting	 ﾠ
further	 ﾠ appeal	 ﾠ called	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ judicial	 ﾠ re-ﾭ‐examination	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ supreme	 ﾠ court.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ judicial	 ﾠ re-ﾭ‐
examination	 ﾠcan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpursued	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠnew	 ﾠevidence,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠput	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠtrial	 ﾠ
previously.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠis	 ﾠeconomical.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠ
system	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠrules	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠthree	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠcosts,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠ
Rp2500	 ﾠto	 ﾠRp10,000	 ﾠ(US$0.29	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ1.16),	 ﾠirrespective	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠlong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrials	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconducted.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Owing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefendant	 ﾠmake	 ﾠan	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠreaching	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt.	 ﾠAlmost	 ﾠall	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠcases	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdealt	 ﾠby	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
appealed	 ﾠup	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ prosecuted	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ cases	 ﾠ tend	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ educated	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ comparison	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
defendants	 ﾠfor	 ﾠother	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠoffences	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠtheft,	 ﾠrobbery,	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠdamage,	 ﾠetc)4.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠ
game	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠrational	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠto	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcase	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠ
court	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ system	 ﾠ allows	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ doing	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ court	 ﾠ cost,	 ﾠ apart	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ hiring	 ﾠ lawyer,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
economical.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Figure	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠComparison	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠCases	 ﾠAcross	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠCourts	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcases	 ﾠappealed	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠlike	 ﾠa	 ﾠtube	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠpipe,	 ﾠwhereby	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠdealth	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠ
dealth	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠsince	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠall	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠcases	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwere	 ﾠtrialed	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠappealed.	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠan	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠeither	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefendant	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ prosecutor,	 ﾠ then	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ certaintly	 ﾠ end	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ supreme	 ﾠ court.	 ﾠ Obviously	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
structure	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ distribution	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ cases	 ﾠ dealth	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ courts	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠlaw.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠeither	 ﾠmagistrate	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠcrown	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠappealed	 ﾠin	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcourts.	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
courts	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠappealed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourts.	 ﾠConsequently	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
structure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠlike	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
triangle.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠdata	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠwere	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt’s	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ2001-ﾭ‐
2009.	 ﾠIndeed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠunobserved	 ﾠheterogeneity	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunobserved	 ﾠheterogeneity	 ﾠare	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ
1.  Some	 ﾠ appeals	 ﾠ went	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ courts,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ went	 ﾠ directly	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ supreme	 ﾠ court	 ﾠ
(being	 ﾠaccommodated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel);	 ﾠ
2.  The	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠterminated	 ﾠin	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠis	 ﾠunknown	 ﾠ(unsolved);	 ﾠ
3.  The	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠterminated	 ﾠin	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠis	 ﾠunknown	 ﾠ(unsolved);	 ﾠ
4.  The	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠreported	 ﾠto	 ﾠPolice	 ﾠis	 ﾠunknown	 ﾠ(unsolved).	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The	 ﾠlast	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠunobserved	 ﾠheterogeneity	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunsolveable	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠin	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠ
empircal	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠin	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgement	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
practitioners	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperts	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠin	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
almost	 ﾠcertaintly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠfollowed	 ﾠby	 ﾠan	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠeither	 ﾠby	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠprosecutors5.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Another	 ﾠ consequence	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ structure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ distribution	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ courts	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ tremendous	 ﾠ
pressure	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ task	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ supreme	 ﾠ judges.	 ﾠ Currently,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ 46	 ﾠ supreme	 ﾠ judges	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
Indonesia.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠis	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUSA,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ supreme	 ﾠ judges.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ term	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ populations,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ USA	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ third	 ﾠ largest	 ﾠ
population	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ world,	 ﾠ whereas	 ﾠ Indonesia	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fourth	 ﾠ place.	 ﾠ Nevertheless,	 ﾠ due	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠembraced	 ﾠby	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠ
judges	 ﾠis	 ﾠtotally	 ﾠdifferent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
















Supreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ 24,826	 ﾠ 10,714	 ﾠ 43.16%	 ﾠ 46	 ﾠ 540	 ﾠ 233	 ﾠ
High	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
a.	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠ 8,202	 ﾠ 6,352	 ﾠ 77.44%	 ﾠ 334	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ
b.	 ﾠReligious	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠ 1,952	 ﾠ 1,592	 ﾠ 81.56%	 ﾠ 239	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ
c.	 ﾠState	 ﾠAdministration	 ﾠ
Court	 ﾠ 621	 ﾠ 523	 ﾠ 84.22%	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ 21	 ﾠ 17	 ﾠ
d.	 ﾠMilitary	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠ 425	 ﾠ 303	 ﾠ 71.29%	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ 47	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ
District	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
a.	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠ 2,636,689	 ﾠ 2,601,551	 ﾠ 98.67%	 ﾠ 2,787	 ﾠ 946	 ﾠ 933	 ﾠ
b.	 ﾠReligious	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠ 206,780	 ﾠ 171,573	 ﾠ 82.97%	 ﾠ 2,203	 ﾠ 94	 ﾠ 78	 ﾠ
c.	 ﾠState	 ﾠAdministration	 ﾠ
Court	 ﾠ 1,203	 ﾠ 840	 ﾠ 69.83%	 ﾠ 180	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
d.	 ﾠMilitary	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠ 4,628	 ﾠ 3,838	 ﾠ 82.93%	 ﾠ 73	 ﾠ 63	 ﾠ 53	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠAnnual	 ﾠReport	 ﾠ2006.	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ shows	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ extend	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ burden	 ﾠ faced	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ judges	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ various	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ courts	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
Indonesia.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠappealed	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
courts.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcases	 ﾠappealed	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠ3	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠUnfortunately	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ46	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia,	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
334	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcourts,	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsuprising	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠcase	 ﾠper	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠgrateful	 ﾠto	 ﾠEddy	 ﾠOS	 ﾠHiarej	 ﾠand	 ﾠHifdzil	 ﾠAlim	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ(540	 ﾠcases)	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ(25	 ﾠcases).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
judges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠto	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠ77.44%	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠappealed,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠ
court	 ﾠ judges	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ managed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ complete	 ﾠ 43.16%	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ cases	 ﾠ appealed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ supreme	 ﾠ court.	 ﾠ
Obviously	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbacklock	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcases	 ﾠtackled	 ﾠ	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠand	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
dealt	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠCost	 ﾠof	 ﾠCorruption	 ﾠ
Each	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠburdens	 ﾠor	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsociety.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠways	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
estimate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠBrand	 ﾠand	 ﾠPrice,	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠDubourg	 ﾠet	 ﾠal,	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠamong	 ﾠ
others).	 ﾠ Brand	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Price	 ﾠ (2000)	 ﾠ proposed	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ crime	 ﾠ consist	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ three	 ﾠ main	 ﾠ
elements,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠin	 ﾠanticipation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠto	 ﾠvictims	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
costs	 ﾠin	 ﾠreaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime.	 ﾠCorruption	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠextra	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠcrime,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠvictims.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠsome	 ﾠextend,	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
victimless	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffences,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠsome	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠ
impacts	 ﾠto	 ﾠvictims	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠrobbery,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperson,	 ﾠsexual	 ﾠoffences,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Corruption	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠmisallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠresources	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠextend	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠmany	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsociety.	 ﾠUsing	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠframework	 ﾠas	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠBrand	 ﾠand	 ﾠPrice’s	 ﾠ
(2000),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠusing	 ﾠfour	 ﾠelements	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ
1.  the	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠin	 ﾠanticipation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption,	 ﾠ
2.  the	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3.  the	 ﾠimplicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption,	 ﾠ
4.  the	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠin	 ﾠreaction	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠmeasuring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmisallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠresources	 ﾠowing	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorruption,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplicit	 ﾠ
costs	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseparated.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamount	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmisallocated	 ﾠto	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠpurpose.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠimplicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
measure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠmisallocating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresources,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠloss	 ﾠin	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
multiplier	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmisallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠto	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠpurpose.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
According	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanti	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠact,	 ﾠany	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠby	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠor	 ﾠcorporation	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠeither	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠand	 ﾠor	 ﾠabuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmay	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠto	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠor	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ
budget	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanti	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠact	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
limited	 ﾠto	 ﾠmisallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠmoney.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffences	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠanti	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠact	 ﾠis	 ﾠnarrower	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN	 ﾠconvention	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
2003,	 ﾠwhereby	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠratified	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠanti	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠact	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
cover	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠby	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsector,	 ﾠmoreover	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠ
politic	 ﾠis	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠis	 ﾠquite	 ﾠironic	 ﾠsince	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠCriminal	 ﾠCode	 ﾠ(KUHP)	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠstated	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠpolitic	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠoffence,	 ﾠunfortunately	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanti	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠmain	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠmay	 ﾠinflict	 ﾠ
losses	 ﾠto	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠbudget.	 ﾠIdeally	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠof	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠin	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠuses	 ﾠEconomics	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠby	 ﾠestimating	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ corruption.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ practice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Indonesia	 ﾠ judicial	 ﾠ system	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ estimation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
losses	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ economy	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ due	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ limited	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
corruption.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠby	 ﾠprosecutors,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠ
well	 ﾠ versed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ area	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ law	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ limited	 ﾠ knowledge	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Economics.	 ﾠ From	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
perspective	 ﾠof	 ﾠEconomics,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠto	 ﾠprosecute	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
committing	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ contains	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ probability	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ making	 ﾠ error	 ﾠ types	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ II	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ court	 ﾠ
sentences.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠand	 ﾠimplicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseparated	 ﾠin	 ﾠevery	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
many	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠare	 ﾠoverwhelmed	 ﾠby	 ﾠits	 ﾠimplicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠor	 ﾠimplicit	 ﾠ
benefits.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ instance,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ compensate	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ fuel	 ﾠ prices,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Indonesian	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠto	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlow	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠsix	 ﾠmonths.	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠanalyse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitiative,	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠmerits	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinitiative	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠdearly	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtaxpayers.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠconsideration,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitiative	 ﾠmay	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠmultiplier	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠin	 ﾠanalysing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitiative.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠBrand	 ﾠand	 ﾠPrice	 ﾠ(2000)	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠby	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠ
multiplier	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠoffence.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfor	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠall	 ﾠoffences,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
offences	 ﾠis	 ﾠunknown.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecorded	 ﾠoffences	 ﾠreported	 ﾠby	 ﾠPolice	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠtip	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠan	 ﾠiceberg,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠunrecorded	 ﾠoffences	 ﾠis	 ﾠunknown.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠunrecorded	 ﾠ
offences	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠby	 ﾠestimating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠmultiplier.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠmultiplier	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠby	 ﾠcomparing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwere	 ﾠvictimised	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthey	 ﾠreport	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreport.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmultiplier	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ
estimate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠunrecorded	 ﾠoffences.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffences,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
summation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ recorded	 ﾠ offences	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ estimated	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ unrecorded	 ﾠ
offences.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠ far	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ comprehensive	 ﾠ survey	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ crime	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ victimisation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Indonesia,	 ﾠ
consequently	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠmultiplier	 ﾠon	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠestimated.	 ﾠOwing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠinto	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠunrecorded	 ﾠoffences	 ﾠas	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠBrand	 ﾠand	 ﾠPrice	 ﾠ(2000).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ paper	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ underestimated,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ taken	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ
consideration	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ offence	 ﾠ multiplier	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ opportunity	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ misallocation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
resources	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠby	 ﾠprosecutors	 ﾠand	 ﾠstated	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ
decisions.	 ﾠBased	 ﾠon	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠwas	 ﾠRp	 ﾠ73.10	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ(US$	 ﾠ8.49	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠin	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠis	 ﾠRp8600:	 ﾠUS$1).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠslightly	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠexpansion	 ﾠ(Rp72	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠ$8.37	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠallocated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndonesian	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
global	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2001-ﾭ‐2009	 ﾠwas	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ7.3%	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indonesian	 ﾠannual	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠor	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ6.08%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannual	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ2	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcorruptions	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠby	 ﾠmale	 ﾠ(93%).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
occurs	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsector	 ﾠare	 ﾠstill	 ﾠdominated	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
male.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠ544	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwere	 ﾠfound	 ﾠguilty	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ36	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
female	 ﾠ(6.67%).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfemale	 ﾠcorruptors	 ﾠtook	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ0.03%	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ99.92%	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcorrupted	 ﾠby	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmale	 ﾠcounterparts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠterm	 ﾠof	 ﾠage,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruptions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠby	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠ
age	 ﾠ(below	 ﾠ60	 ﾠyear	 ﾠold).	 ﾠOf	 ﾠ544	 ﾠcorruptors,	 ﾠ479	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠ(88.70%)	 ﾠwere	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠ60	 ﾠyear	 ﾠold,	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ60	 ﾠcorruptors	 ﾠ(11.11%)	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ60	 ﾠyear	 ﾠold	 ﾠor	 ﾠolder.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
characteristics	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ offenders	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ conventional	 ﾠ crimes,	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ burglary,	 ﾠ theft,	 ﾠ robbery,	 ﾠ etc.	 ﾠ
Bowles	 ﾠand	 ﾠPradiptyo	 ﾠ(2005)	 ﾠused	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠOffender	 ﾠIndex	 ﾠdata	 ﾠand	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
conventional	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠare	 ﾠaged	 ﾠsensitive.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠstarted	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠcarrier	 ﾠas	 ﾠearly	 ﾠas	 ﾠ8	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠ9	 ﾠyears	 ﾠold,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠthey	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠstop	 ﾠoffending	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠreach	 ﾠage	 ﾠof	 ﾠ40.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ reached	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ age	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 40	 ﾠ year	 ﾠ old,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ beginning	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcarrier	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorruptor	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthey	 ﾠstarted	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠposition	 ﾠat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠage.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠExplicit	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠCosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠCorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠ2001-ﾭ‐2008	 ﾠBased	 ﾠon	 ﾠGender,	 ﾠ
Location	 ﾠand	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ







	 ﾠ	 ﾠ%	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ%	 ﾠ Average	 ﾠ
Gender	 ﾠ
Male	 ﾠ 504	 ﾠ 93.33%	 ﾠ
Rp	 ﾠ73.05	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
99.92%	 ﾠ
Rp144.93	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(US$8.49	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ (US$	 ﾠ16.85	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ




(US$2.32	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ (US$	 ﾠ64,560)	 ﾠ




(US$4.07	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ (US$1.02	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Age	 ﾠ




(US$4.50	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ (US$9.40	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
60+	 ﾠ 60	 ﾠ 11.11%	 ﾠ
Rp34.34	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ
46.98%	 ﾠ
Rp572.37	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(US$3.99	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ (US$66.55	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ




(US$4.07	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ (US$1.02	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Location	 ﾠ




(US$4.34	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ (US$	 ﾠ18.03	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠGreater	 ﾠ
Jakarta	 ﾠ
(Jabodetabek)*	 ﾠ 78	 ﾠ 32.37%	 ﾠ
Rp36.86	 ﾠTrilion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
98.67%	 ﾠ
Rp472.64	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ
(US$4.15	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ (US$54.96	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Outside	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠ 299	 ﾠ 55.37%	 ﾠ
Rp35.70	 ﾠtrilion	 ﾠ
48.89%	 ﾠ
Rp119.41	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(US$4.15	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ (US$13.89	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ




(US$4.07	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ (US$1.02	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Occupation	 ﾠ
Civil	 ﾠServant	 ﾠ 223	 ﾠ 41.30%	 ﾠ
Rp470.15	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
0.64%	 ﾠ
Rp2.11	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ
(US$	 ﾠ54.67	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠ (US$245,226)	 ﾠ
State-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠ
Enterprise	 ﾠ
Employee	 ﾠ 68	 ﾠ 12.59%	 ﾠ
Rp29.33	 ﾠtrilion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
40.12%	 ﾠ
Rp431.31	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(US$3.41	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ (US$50,152)	 ﾠ
Legislative	 ﾠ 130	 ﾠ 24.07%	 ﾠ
Rp216.65	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
0.30%	 ﾠ
Rp1.66	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(US$25.19	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ (US$193,837)	 ﾠ
Private	 ﾠSector	 ﾠ 117	 ﾠ 21.67%	 ﾠ
Rp37.75	 ﾠtrilion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
51.64%	 ﾠ
Rp322.63	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ
(US$4.39	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ (US$37.51	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ




(US$620.47	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ (US$103,41	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ




(US$8.50	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ (US$15.741	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠDecisions,	 ﾠ2001-ﾭ‐2009.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠsenior	 ﾠcorruptors	 ﾠwas	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ11.11%,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
inflicted	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠwas	 ﾠRp34.34	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ(US$3.99	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠor	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ46.98%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
total	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption.	 ﾠ Since	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ senior	 ﾠ corruptors	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ 60	 ﾠ individuals,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ
average	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠby	 ﾠsenior	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠ(aged	 ﾠ60	 ﾠyear	 ﾠold	 ﾠor	 ﾠabove)	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠthen	 ﾠseven	 ﾠfolds	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠby	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠat	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠaged.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ term	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ geographical	 ﾠ distribution,	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 544	 ﾠ offenders,	 ﾠ 241	 ﾠ offenders	 ﾠ (44.63%)	 ﾠ committed	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠisland	 ﾠof	 ﾠJawa.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠwas	 ﾠaccounted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Rp37.36	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ(US$4.34	 ﾠbillion),	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠRp	 ﾠRp36.86	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ(US$4.15	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠor	 ﾠ98.67%	 ﾠ
occurred	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Greater	 ﾠ Jakarta	 ﾠ (Jabodetabek,	 ﾠ stand	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Jakarta-ﾭ‐Bogor-ﾭ‐Depok-ﾭ‐Tangerang	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
Bekasi).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠJakarta	 ﾠwas	 ﾠRp472.64	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ(US$54.96	 ﾠ
million)	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthree	 ﾠfolds	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠor	 ﾠabout	 ﾠfour	 ﾠfolds	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠJawa.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ highest	 ﾠ proportion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ attributable	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ offenders	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ
private	 ﾠsectors	 ﾠ51.64%	 ﾠor	 ﾠabout	 ﾠRp37.75	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ(US$4.39	 ﾠbillion).	 ﾠIndeed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠis	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmisallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠmoney.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠinvolvement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
private	 ﾠsector	 ﾠin	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠis	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠof	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠand	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsector.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhighest	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠwas	 ﾠattributable	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
state-ﾭ‐own	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠemployees.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠrecoded	 ﾠthat	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ68	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐own	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ found	 ﾠ guilty	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ committing	 ﾠ corruption,	 ﾠ however	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ average	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠthey	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠto	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠwas	 ﾠRp431.31	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ(US$50.15	 ﾠmillion).	 ﾠMost	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠState-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠalso	 ﾠlocal-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠowned)	 ﾠenterprises’	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠprocurement,	 ﾠembezzlement	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠconducts	 ﾠduring	 ﾠand	 ﾠpost	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ1998,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwere	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠinterests.	 ﾠ
Civil	 ﾠservants	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparliament	 ﾠ(both	 ﾠin	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠand	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlevels)	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠa	 ﾠquarter	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
cases	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Indonesia.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ contrast	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ State-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠ companies	 ﾠ employee,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ average	 ﾠ value	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ civil	 ﾠ servants	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ senators	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ Rp2.11	 ﾠ billion	 ﾠ ($245,226)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Rp1.66	 ﾠ
billion	 ﾠ($193,837),	 ﾠrespectively.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠusing	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ underestimated.	 ﾠ Given	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Indonesia	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ relatively	 ﾠ high,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ absence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ attempt	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ recover	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
misallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠresources,	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbourne	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtaxpayers.	 ﾠ
Unfortunately	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndonesia’s	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecover	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmisallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠresources	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠby	 ﾠcorruptors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 17	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishments	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia’s	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
system,	 ﾠnamely:	 ﾠfines,	 ﾠcompensation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠseizure	 ﾠof	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠ(monetary	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon	 ﾠmonetary),	 ﾠ
court	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠsentence.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcomprises	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
fines,	 ﾠ compensation	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ seizure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ asset	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ evidence.	 ﾠ Non	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ
seizure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ asset	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ evidence	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ included	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ variable	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ face	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ complexity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
converting	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠvalue.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠcost	 ﾠis	 ﾠnegligible	 ﾠas	 ﾠits	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠranges	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠRp	 ﾠ
2500	 ﾠto	 ﾠRp	 ﾠ10,000	 ﾠ($0.29	 ﾠto	 ﾠ$1.16),	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠnegligible.	 ﾠ
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($	 ﾠ619.77	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($	 ﾠ1.14	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠDecisions	 ﾠ2001-ﾭ‐2009,	 ﾠestimated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ shows	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ discrepancy	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ total	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ
punishment	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia’s	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠPrior	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrial	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠcourt,	 ﾠ
prosecutors	 ﾠ estimated	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ value	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ trial,	 ﾠ then,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
prosecutions	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprosecutors.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
during	 ﾠ 2001-ﾭ‐2009	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ Rp73.10	 ﾠ trillion	 ﾠ (US$	 ﾠ 8.49	 ﾠ billion),	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ surprisingly	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ defendants	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠprosecuted	 ﾠonly	 ﾠRp32.40	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ(US$	 ﾠ3.77	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠor	 ﾠ59.37%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
corruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠessence,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠphenomenon	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠanalysed	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbargaining	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbargaining	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
described	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodelling	 ﾠof	 ﾠsplitting	 ﾠa	 ﾠpie,	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠsize	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpie	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠ
cost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠprosecutors	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrealise	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpie	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠRp73.10	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ($8.50	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ
billion)	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ total	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ Rp135.37	 ﾠ billion	 ﾠ ($15.74	 ﾠ million)	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ average	 ﾠ value.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Instead	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ prosecuting	 ﾠ
defendants	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠprosecute	 ﾠonly	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ60%	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠUnfortunately,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
mechanism	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdone	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprosecutors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
From	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomists,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠphenomenon	 ﾠis	 ﾠpuzzling,	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠas	 ﾠirrational.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠbargaining	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘splitting	 ﾠa	 ﾠpie’,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠto	 ﾠprosecute	 ﾠ
defendant	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ equal	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ values	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
incorporate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ opportunity	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ misallocation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ resources.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ notion	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ based	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ
assumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘negotiation’processes	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrials	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠfulfil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠprosecuted.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
analysed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ comparing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ value	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ total	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ punishment	 ﾠ prosecuted	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ total	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ
punishment	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDistrict	 ﾠcourts.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ courts,	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 544	 ﾠ defendants	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ found	 ﾠ guilty	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ district	 ﾠ courts,	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ 468	 ﾠ
defendants	 ﾠ(86.03%)	 ﾠwere	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfound	 ﾠguilty	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcourts.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠ
sentenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠshrunk	 ﾠto	 ﾠRp2.39	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ($	 ﾠ277.79	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠor	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ3.27%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
total	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ final	 ﾠ stage,	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ cases	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ appealed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
supreme	 ﾠcourt,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwere	 ﾠfound	 ﾠguilty	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠ 544	 ﾠ individuals.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ total	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ punishment	 ﾠ sentenced	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ supreme	 ﾠ court	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ
increased	 ﾠto	 ﾠRp5.33	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ($	 ﾠ619.77	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠor	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ7.29%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
corruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ4	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscrepancies	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
punishment	 ﾠprosecuted,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
total	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠratio	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
explicit	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ total	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ punishment	 ﾠ prosecuted	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ 3.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
surprising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprosecuted	 ﾠ60%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠ
inflicted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsociety.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrials	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbargaining	 ﾠproblem,	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
likely	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendant	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlesser	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprosecution,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprosecutors	 ﾠto	 ﾠprosecute	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
explicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠinflicted.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthis	 ﾠargument	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
cost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠcovers	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠ
costs	 ﾠincurred	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmisallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠresources	 ﾠowing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprescription	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠbargaining	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠ(Nash,	 ﾠ1951,	 ﾠRubinstein,	 ﾠ1982,	 ﾠamong	 ﾠothers),	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ Indonesia	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ strong	 ﾠ tendency	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ prosecute	 ﾠ defendants	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ
punishment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ4:	 ﾠRatios	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠin	 ﾠ











Judges	 ﾠin	 ﾠDistrict	 ﾠ




Judges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Supreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ
(D)	 ﾠ
(B/A)	 ﾠ (C/A)   (D/A) 
Gender	 ﾠ
Male	 ﾠ
Rp73.05	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 32.40	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Rp2.38	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Rp5.31	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ
44.35%	 ﾠ 3.26%  7.27% 
($8.494	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ ($3.77	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ ($276.74	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($617.44	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Female	 ﾠ
Rp19.99	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12.33	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3.22	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Rp10.63	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
61.68%	 ﾠ 16.11%  53.18% 
($2.32	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($1.43	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($374,419)	 ﾠ ($1.24	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Age	 ﾠ
Below	 ﾠ60	 ﾠ
Rp38.72	 ﾠtrillon	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3.84	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Rp2.13	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Rp2.73	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
9.92%	 ﾠ 5.50%  7.05% 
($4.50	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ ($447	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($247.67	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($301.42	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
60	 ﾠor	 ﾠAbove	 ﾠ
Rp34.34	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Rp28.56	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Rp259.22	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Rp2.59	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ
83.17%	 ﾠ 0.75%  7.54% 
($3.99	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ ($3.32	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ ($30.14	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($301.16	 ﾠmilion)	 ﾠ
Location	 ﾠ
Jawa	 ﾠ
Rp37.36	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Rp32.01	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Rp2.39	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Rp4.99	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
85.68%	 ﾠ 6.40%  13.36% 
($4.34	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ ($3.72	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ ($277.91	 ﾠMillion)	 ﾠ ($580.23	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠGreater	 ﾠ
Jakarta	 ﾠ
Rp36.87	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Rp31.56	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Rp1.95	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Rp4.81	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
85.60%	 ﾠ 5.29%  13.05% 
($4.29	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ ($3.67	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ ($226.74	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($559.30	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Outside	 ﾠ
Jawa	 ﾠ























   ($3.41	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ ($3.39	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ ($17.45	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($288.37	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Legislative	 ﾠ





   ($25.19	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($11.87	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($6.82	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($6.41	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Private	 ﾠ
Sector	 ﾠ





   ($4.39	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ ($340	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ ($239.53	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($308.14	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠDecisions	 ﾠ2001-ﾭ‐2009,	 ﾠestimated.	 ﾠ
Information	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠratio	 ﾠB/A	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠ
prosecuted	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ total	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ gender,	 ﾠ age,	 ﾠ geographical	 ﾠ
distributions	 ﾠand	 ﾠoccupations.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠwere	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠindividuals,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
prosecutors,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ surprisingly	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ values	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ significantly	 ﾠ different.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ majority	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Indonesia	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ committed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ male,	 ﾠ however	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ tendency	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
female	 ﾠcorruptors	 ﾠ(61.68%)	 ﾠwere	 ﾠprosecuted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠmale	 ﾠcounterparts	 ﾠ(44,35%).	 ﾠCorruptors	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠage	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprosecuted	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠ lesser	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ punishment	 ﾠ (only	 ﾠ 9.92%)	 ﾠ then	 ﾠ offenders	 ﾠ aged	 ﾠ 60	 ﾠ year	 ﾠ old	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ above	 ﾠ
(83.17%).	 ﾠOffenders	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠ(86.68%),	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprosecuted	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠheavily	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠ(1.13%).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
term	 ﾠof	 ﾠoccupation,	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwho	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠworked	 ﾠas	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐own	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
prosecuted	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠheavier	 ﾠ(99.42%)	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorruptors	 ﾠwho	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠworked	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠoccupations.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary,	 ﾠcorruptors	 ﾠwho	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠworked	 ﾠin	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsector	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
prosecuted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠleniently	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠoccupations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠratio	 ﾠC/A	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
district	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠratio	 ﾠD/A,	 ﾠfurthermore,	 ﾠ
measures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠ
explicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠestimations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠratio	 ﾠC/A	 ﾠare	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlesser	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠin	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠratio	 ﾠB/A.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠare	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠ
lesser	 ﾠthan	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠprosecuted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
prosecutors.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠratios	 ﾠof	 ﾠC/A	 ﾠacross	 ﾠgender,	 ﾠage,	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠdistributions	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
occupations	 ﾠwere	 ﾠless	 ﾠthen	 ﾠ10%,	 ﾠunless	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfemale	 ﾠcorruptors	 ﾠ(16.11%),	 ﾠand	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
previously	 ﾠworked	 ﾠas	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠservant	 ﾠ(25.72%)	 ﾠand	 ﾠmember	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparliament	 ﾠ(27.08%).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠratios	 ﾠof	 ﾠD/A	 ﾠacross	 ﾠgender,	 ﾠage,	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠand	 ﾠoccupations	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
higher	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠratio	 ﾠC/A.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
supreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠcorrections	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠcourts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠmale	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠlesser	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠ(7.27%)	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠ opposed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ female	 ﾠ counterparts	 ﾠ (53.18%).	 ﾠ Both	 ﾠ offenders	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
productive	 ﾠage	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsenior	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
supreme	 ﾠcourt,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ7%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠgap	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠratios	 ﾠof	 ﾠD/A	 ﾠwas	 ﾠfound	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠand	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠJawa.	 ﾠ
Those	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ committed	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Jawa	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ratio	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ D/A	 ﾠ 13.36%,	 ﾠ whereas	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
counterparts	 ﾠin	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠonly	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ0.92%	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠratios	 ﾠD/A	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ratios	 ﾠof	 ﾠC/A	 ﾠacross	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠoccupations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Table	 ﾠ5:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠAverage	 ﾠExplicit	 ﾠCost	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAverage	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠPunishment	 ﾠAcross	 ﾠGender,	 ﾠAge,	 ﾠ













Judges	 ﾠin	 ﾠDistrict	 ﾠ




Judges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Supreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Gender	 ﾠ
Male	 ﾠ 504	 ﾠ
Rp145.63	 ﾠ
billion	 ﾠ Rp64.29	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ Rp4.72	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ Rp10.54	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ
($16.93	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($7.48	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($549,091)	 ﾠ ($1.23	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Female	 ﾠ 36	 ﾠ
Rp555.28	 ﾠ




($64,567)	 ﾠ ($39,826)	 ﾠ ($10,401)	 ﾠ ($34,335)	 ﾠ
Age	 ﾠ
Below	 ﾠ60	 ﾠ 479	 ﾠ
Rp80.84	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ Rp8.02	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ Rp4.45	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ Rp5.70	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ
($9.40	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($932.17	 ﾠ
million)	 ﾠ ($517,066)	 ﾠ ($662,718)	 ﾠ




billion	 ﾠ Rp4.32	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ Rp43.17	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ
($66.55	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($55.35	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($502.36	 ﾠ
million)	 ﾠ ($5.02	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Location	 ﾠ




billion	 ﾠ Rp9.92	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ Rp20.71	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ
($18.03	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($15.44	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($1.15	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($2.41	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠGreater	 ﾠ




billion	 ﾠ Rp25.00	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ Rp61.67	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ
($54.96	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($47.05	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($2.91	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($7.17	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Outside	 ﾠ
Jawa	 ﾠ 299	 ﾠ
Rp119.40	 ﾠ
billion	 ﾠ Rp1.34	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ Rp285.42	 ﾠ
million	 ﾠ Rp1.10	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ
($13.88	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($156,218)	 ﾠ ($33,188)	 ﾠ ($127,802)	 ﾠ
Occupation	 ﾠ
Civil	 ﾠ
Servant	 ﾠ 223	 ﾠ















billion	 ﾠ Rp2.21	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ Rp36.47	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ
($50.15	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($49.86	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($.256,635)	 ﾠ ($4.24	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Legislative	 ﾠ 130	 ﾠ
Rp1.67	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ Rp785.38	 ﾠ
million	 ﾠ
Rp451.31	 ﾠ
million	 ﾠ Rp424	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠ
($193,784)	 ﾠ ($91,324)	 ﾠ ($52,478)	 ﾠ ($49,302)	 ﾠ
Private	 ﾠ
Sector	 ﾠ 117	 ﾠ
Rp322.65	 ﾠ
billion	 ﾠ Rp24.96	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ Rp17.61	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ Rp22.65	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ
($37.52	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($2.90	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($2.05	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ ($2.63	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠDecisions	 ﾠ2001-ﾭ‐2009,	 ﾠestimated.	 ﾠ
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The	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠDecisions	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠare	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠways	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstudy,	 ﾠa	 ﾠlogistic	 ﾠregression	 ﾠis	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
various	 ﾠ criminogenic	 ﾠ factors	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ decisions	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ judges.	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ logistic	 ﾠ
regression	 ﾠuses	 ﾠa	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠbinary	 ﾠalternatives	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfined	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimprisonement	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠetc)	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleft	 ﾠhand	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠ
independent	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠor	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠhand	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
criterion	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcovariates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
explanation	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSig	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ0.05	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠlevel)	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ0.01	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠ1%	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠlevel).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠLikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠConviction	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠeconometric	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠis	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠ




SCguilty	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠdecisions,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ=	 ﾠguilty,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ=	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠ
Age	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Age	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠDistrict	 ﾠcourts.	 ﾠ
Gender	 ﾠ	 ﾠ :	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmale	 ﾠand	 ﾠ0	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfemale	 ﾠ
D_Jawa	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Dummy	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlocation,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ=	 ﾠthe	 ﾠisland	 ﾠof	 ﾠJawa,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ=	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠ
D_SOE	 ﾠ	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Dummy	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoccupation,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ=	 ﾠState-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠEnterprises	 ﾠEmployees,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠ
D_MP	 ﾠ	 ﾠ :	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Dummy	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoccupation,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ=	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparliaments	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlevels,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ=	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠ
D_Private	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Dummy	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoccupation,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ=	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsector,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ=	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠ
Log_ExplicitCost	 ﾠ:	 ﾠlog(explicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠat	 ﾠnominal	 ﾠprice)	 ﾠ
DC_guilty	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Dummy	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠguilty	 ﾠas	 ﾠcharged;	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠguilty,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ:	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠ
DSOE*log_ExpCost:	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdummy	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠdefendant	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠState	 ﾠOwn	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠEnterprise	 ﾠEmployee	 ﾠand	 ﾠlog(explicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠdefendant)	 ﾠ
DSenator*log_ExpCost:	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdummy	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠdefendant	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsenator	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠlog(explicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendant)	 ﾠ
DPrivate*log_ExpCost:	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdummy	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠdefendant	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠservant	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠlog(explicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendant)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ equations	 ﾠ above	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ based	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ assumption	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ likelihood	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ conviction	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠstatic	 ﾠand	 ﾠdynamic	 ﾠcriminogenic	 ﾠfactors.	 ﾠGender	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistric	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠ
decisions	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ static	 ﾠ criminogenic	 ﾠ factors,	 ﾠ whereas	 ﾠ age	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ occupations	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 23	 ﾠ
classified	 ﾠas	 ﾠdynamic	 ﾠcriminogenic	 ﾠfactors.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠpenal	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
trials	 ﾠare	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarea	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcommitted.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
17,508	 ﾠislands	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠthe	 ﾠisland	 ﾠof	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentre	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
activities	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠisland	 ﾠof	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠis	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ7%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠarea	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia,	 ﾠ
however	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ240	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia,	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ60%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ(about	 ﾠ114	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠ
people)	 ﾠlive	 ﾠin	 ﾠJawa.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsurprising	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠin	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠadvanced	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ islands	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Indonesia.	 ﾠ Based	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ reason,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ dummy	 ﾠ variable	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
generated	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvestigate	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Jawa	 ﾠand	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠJawa.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Results	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdescriptive	 ﾠstatistic	 ﾠshowed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠvaries	 ﾠacross	 ﾠoccupations	 ﾠ
(see	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ1-ﾭ‐5	 ﾠabove).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠis	 ﾠaccommodated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠby	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠthree	 ﾠdummies	 ﾠ
variables	 ﾠaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠoccuption	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
model,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠservant	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠused	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreference	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠdummy	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠoccupation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠlogistic	 ﾠregression	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠ	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠmay	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdynamic	 ﾠand	 ﾠcriminogenic	 ﾠfactors.	 ﾠ
Furthermore,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcorrespond	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnominal	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠnominal	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠboth	 ﾠprosecutors	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
according	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠprice	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠprice.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠthree	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠ
variables	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdummy	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoccupations	 ﾠ
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Table	 ﾠ6:	 ﾠLogistic	 ﾠRegression	 ﾠAnalyses	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠCourt’s	 ﾠSentences	 ﾠ
Dependent	 ﾠVariable:	 ﾠSC_Guilty_YN	 ﾠ
Sample:	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ831;	 ﾠIncluded	 ﾠobservations:	 ﾠ811;	 ﾠExcluded	 ﾠ
observations:	 ﾠ20	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Coeff.	 ﾠ S.E	 ﾠ Prob.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
C	 ﾠ 1.445	 ﾠ 2.15	 ﾠ 0.501	 ﾠ
DC_Guilty_YN	 ﾠ 3.282	 ﾠ 1.124	 ﾠ 0.004***	 ﾠ
Gender	 ﾠ 0.118	 ﾠ 0.368	 ﾠ 0.748	 ﾠ
Log(Age)	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.922	 ﾠ 0.511	 ﾠ 0.071*	 ﾠ
D_Jawa	 ﾠ 0.44	 ﾠ 0.219	 ﾠ 0.045**	 ﾠ
D_Greater	 ﾠJakarta	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.316	 ﾠ 0.39	 ﾠ 0.418	 ﾠ
D_SOE_empl.	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐5.016	 ﾠ 3.883	 ﾠ 0.196	 ﾠ
D_MP	 ﾠ 4.29	 ﾠ 2.486	 ﾠ 0.084*	 ﾠ
D_Private	 ﾠ 2.639	 ﾠ 1.703	 ﾠ 0.121	 ﾠ
D_Appeal_HC	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.62	 ﾠ 1.125	 ﾠ 0.582	 ﾠ
D_JudRev	 ﾠ 1.663	 ﾠ 0.404	 ﾠ 0.000***	 ﾠ
Log_ExplicitCost	 ﾠ 0.047	 ﾠ 0.059	 ﾠ 0.425	 ﾠ
Log_ExpCost*D_BUMN	 ﾠ 0.314	 ﾠ 0.192	 ﾠ 0.102	 ﾠ
Log_ExpCost*D_MP	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.24	 ﾠ 0.126	 ﾠ 0.057*	 ﾠ
Log_ExpCost*D_Private	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.116	 ﾠ 0.086	 ﾠ 0.175	 ﾠ
Mean	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvar	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0.663	 ﾠ
S.E.	 ﾠof	 ﾠregression	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0.377	 ﾠ
Sum	 ﾠsquared	 ﾠresid	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
113.3	 ﾠ
Log	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐359.9	 ﾠ
Restr.	 ﾠlog	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐518	 ﾠ
LR	 ﾠstatistic	 ﾠ(11	 ﾠdf)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
316.2	 ﾠ
Probability(LR	 ﾠstat)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMcFadden	 ﾠR-ﾭ‐squared	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.305	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠDecisions	 ﾠ2001-ﾭ‐2009,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠestimated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ6	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠ
made	 ﾠby	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠcourts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcontradicted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠand	 ﾠprosecutors	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠ
courts	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ decisions	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ favour.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ addition,	 ﾠ defendants	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ committed	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠand	 ﾠwere	 ﾠtrialed	 ﾠin	 ﾠJawa,	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠguilty	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
supreme	 ﾠ judges,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ though	 ﾠ statistically	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ weakly	 ﾠ significant.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ finding	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
interesting	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ average	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ inflicted	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ offenders	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Jawa	 ﾠ
(Rp155.03	 ﾠ billion	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ US$18.03	 ﾠ million)	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ offenders	 ﾠ outside	 ﾠ Jawa	 ﾠ
(Rp119.41	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠor	 ﾠUS$13.89	 ﾠmillion).	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠif	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠin	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠare	 ﾠfound	 ﾠguilty,	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ	 ﾠ$2.41	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠor	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠ18.86	 ﾠtime	 ﾠfolds	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcounterparts	 ﾠin	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠJawa.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetection	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠJawa,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠ
prosecutors	 ﾠin	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠJawa	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlenient	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendants.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Imprisonment	 ﾠand	 ﾠProbation	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠlogistic	 ﾠregression	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠto	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ




SC_Imprisonment	 ﾠ=	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwith	 ﾠimprisonment,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ=	 ﾠYes,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ=	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ
SC_Probation=	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobation,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ=	 ﾠYes,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ=	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ7	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠsentencing	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠwith	 ﾠimprisonment	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcorrespond	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠproof,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
receive	 ﾠimprisonment.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠby	 ﾠMPs,	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠimprisonment	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠservant	 ﾠ
counterparts,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠweak.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠanti	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠact	 ﾠ20/2001	 ﾠstated	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠoffences	 ﾠimprisonment	 ﾠand	 ﾠfines	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffenders.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠserious	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsidered,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
severe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠand	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠ[see	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠA].	 ﾠ	 ﾠImprisonment	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffences	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠby	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠquite	 ﾠserious.	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠ punishment	 ﾠ prosecuted	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ used	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ indicator	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ serious	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ offence	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠto	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠwith	 ﾠimprisonment	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
taken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscale	 ﾠof	 ﾠdamaged	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Table	 ﾠ7:	 ﾠLogistic	 ﾠRegressions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠImprisonment	 ﾠ
Dependent	 ﾠVariable:	 ﾠSC_Imprisonment_YN	 ﾠ Dependent	 ﾠVariable:	 ﾠSC_Probation_YN	 ﾠ
Sample(adjusted):	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ831;	 ﾠIncluded	 ﾠobservations:	 ﾠ472;	 ﾠ
Excluded	 ﾠobservations:	 ﾠ356	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Sample(adjusted):	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ830;	 ﾠIncluded	 ﾠobservations:	 ﾠ463;	 ﾠ
Excluded	 ﾠobservations:	 ﾠ366	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Coeff.	 ﾠ S.E	 ﾠ Prob.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Coeff.	 ﾠ S.E	 ﾠ Prob.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
C	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.975	 ﾠ 4.166	 ﾠ 0.475	 ﾠ C	 ﾠ 0.215	 ﾠ 5.022	 ﾠ 0.966	 ﾠ
DC_Imprisonment_YN	 ﾠ 1.661	 ﾠ 1.643	 ﾠ 0.312	 ﾠ DC_Probation_YN	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.033	 ﾠ 0.812	 ﾠ 0.967	 ﾠ
Gender	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.198	 ﾠ 0.846	 ﾠ 0.816	 ﾠ Gender	 ﾠ 0.577	 ﾠ 1.067	 ﾠ 0.589	 ﾠ
Log(Age)	 ﾠ 0.887	 ﾠ 0.97	 ﾠ 0.36	 ﾠ Log(Age)	 ﾠ 0.148	 ﾠ 1.134	 ﾠ 0.896	 ﾠ
D_Jawa	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.385	 ﾠ 0.428	 ﾠ 0.368	 ﾠ D_Jawa	 ﾠ 0.181	 ﾠ 0.464	 ﾠ 0.697	 ﾠ
D_Greater	 ﾠJakarta	 ﾠ 1.177	 ﾠ 1.179	 ﾠ 0.318	 ﾠ D_Greater	 ﾠJakarta	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.521	 ﾠ 0.869	 ﾠ 0.549	 ﾠ
D_SOE_empl.	 ﾠ 3.959	 ﾠ 8.93	 ﾠ 0.658	 ﾠ D_SOE_empl.	 ﾠ 2.612	 ﾠ 8.445	 ﾠ 0.757	 ﾠ
D_MP	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐10.829	 ﾠ 6.311	 ﾠ 0.086*	 ﾠ D_MP	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐22.12	 ﾠ 8.097	 ﾠ 0.006***	 ﾠ
D_Private	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.34	 ﾠ 4.263	 ﾠ 0.583	 ﾠ D_Private	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐10.238	 ﾠ 4.467	 ﾠ 0.022**	 ﾠ
D_Appeal_HC	 ﾠ 1.804	 ﾠ 1.64	 ﾠ 0.271	 ﾠ D_Appeal_HC	 ﾠ 1.349	 ﾠ 1.047	 ﾠ 0.198	 ﾠ
D_JudRev	 ﾠ 1.668	 ﾠ 0.845	 ﾠ 0.049**	 ﾠ D_JudRev	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.839	 ﾠ 0.806	 ﾠ 0.298	 ﾠ
Log_ExplicitCost	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.045	 ﾠ 0.133	 ﾠ 0.734	 ﾠ Log_ExplicitCost	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.271	 ﾠ 0.125	 ﾠ 0.030**	 ﾠ
Log_ExpCost*D_BUMN	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.121	 ﾠ 0.422	 ﾠ 0.775	 ﾠ Log_ExpCost*D_BUMN	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.132	 ﾠ 0.442	 ﾠ 0.765	 ﾠ
Log_ExpCost*D_MP	 ﾠ 0.56	 ﾠ 0.333	 ﾠ 0.093*	 ﾠ Log_ExpCost*D_MP	 ﾠ 1.036	 ﾠ 0.379	 ﾠ 0.006***	 ﾠ
Log_ExpCost*D_Private	 ﾠ 0.135	 ﾠ 0.224	 ﾠ 0.547	 ﾠ Log_ExpCost*D_Private	 ﾠ 0.518	 ﾠ 0.223	 ﾠ 0.020***	 ﾠ
Mean	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvar	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.888	 ﾠ Mean	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvar	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.06	 ﾠ
S.E.	 ﾠof	 ﾠregression	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0.248	 ﾠ S.E.	 ﾠof	 ﾠregression	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0.233	 ﾠ
Sum	 ﾠsquared	 ﾠresid	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
28.087	 ﾠ Sum	 ﾠsquared	 ﾠresid	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
24.4	 ﾠ
Log	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐107.3	 ﾠ Log	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐93.9	 ﾠ
Restr.	 ﾠlog	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐165.8	 ﾠ Restr.	 ﾠlog	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐105.7	 ﾠ
LR	 ﾠstatistic	 ﾠ(11	 ﾠdf)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
117	 ﾠ LR	 ﾠstatistic	 ﾠ(11	 ﾠdf)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
23.5	 ﾠ
Probability(LR	 ﾠstat)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ Probability(LR	 ﾠstat)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0.052	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMcFadden	 ﾠR-ﾭ‐squared	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.353	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMcFadden	 ﾠR-ﾭ‐squared	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.111	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠDecisions	 ﾠ2001-ﾭ‐2009,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconter	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠresult	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobation.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Table	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ shows	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ lesser	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
likelihood	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ defendants	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ sentenced	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ probation.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ
hypothesis	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ serious	 ﾠ corruptors	 ﾠ tend	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ sentenced	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ imprisonment	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
opposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠprobation.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwith	 ﾠoccupations	 ﾠas	 ﾠmember	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsectors	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠlower	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠto	 ﾠprobation	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠservant	 ﾠcounterparts.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠmember	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
sector	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcommit	 ﾠmore	 ﾠserious	 ﾠgravity	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠare	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
probation	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠservant	 ﾠcounterparts.	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In	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠimprisonment	 ﾠis	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
offending	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ quite	 ﾠ serious,	 ﾠ namely	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ offence	 ﾠ gravity6	 ﾠ committed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
offenders	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠhigh.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffences	 ﾠis	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠby	 ﾠhow	 ﾠserious	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠto	 ﾠvictims	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsociety.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠis	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠof	 ﾠserious	 ﾠoffences,	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠmost	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwere	 ﾠproven	 ﾠguilty	 ﾠof	 ﾠconducting	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠimprisonment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ Indonesia,	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ extra	 ﾠ ordinary	 ﾠ crime.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠare	 ﾠhigh,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠideally	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠcan	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠprosecuted	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠa	 ﾠproxy	 ﾠto	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠhow	 ﾠserious	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠis.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠsurprising,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
supreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠprosecuted	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠimprisonment	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
probation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠimprisonment	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcorresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠburden	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠby	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsociety,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠjudges’	 ﾠdecisions,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast,	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
taken	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ consideration	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ concept	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ fairness	 ﾠ proposed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Rabin	 ﾠ (1993).	 ﾠ Rabin	 ﾠ (1993)	 ﾠ
argued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfairness	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠreciprocal	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠaltruistic	 ﾠbehaviour.	 ﾠ
Implementing	 ﾠRabin’s	 ﾠ(1993)	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠfairness	 ﾠto	 ﾠsentencing,	 ﾠideally,	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwho	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠ
high	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ society	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ punished	 ﾠ heavier,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ imprisonment	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ type	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
punishment	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠtough.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠresult	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠwho	 ﾠworked	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmember	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparliament	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ sentenced	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ probation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ comparison	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ defendants	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ
occupations.	 ﾠ Similarly,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ inflicted	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ senator	 ﾠ (the	 ﾠ interaction	 ﾠ
variable	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠsenator	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcost)	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
determine	 ﾠprobation	 ﾠorder.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠare	 ﾠvalid	 ﾠonly	 ﾠat	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠ10%.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Fines	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSubsidiary	 ﾠof	 ﾠFines	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanticorruption	 ﾠact	 ﾠregulate	 ﾠany	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ states	 ﾠ clearly	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ types	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ intensity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
punishment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠoffence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠcertainty,	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseriousness	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠis	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠby	 ﾠoffence	 ﾠgravity	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠindex	 ﾠis	 ﾠranging	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠlightest)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ8	 ﾠ
(the	 ﾠmost	 ﾠserious	 ﾠoffence,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠhomicide,	 ﾠetc).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠ mainly	 ﾠ intepreted	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ informing	 ﾠ stating	 ﾠ clearly	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ type	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ offences,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ type	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
punishments	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠact.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwere	 ﾠstated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠto	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
defendant	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfines	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠof	 ﾠfines	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ




SC_Fines	 ﾠ=	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfines,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ=	 ﾠYes,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ=	 ﾠOtherwise	 ﾠ
SC_Subs_fines=	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfines,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ=	 ﾠYes,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ=	 ﾠOtherwise	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠmodelling	 ﾠof	 ﾠfines	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠsections.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodelling	 ﾠof	 ﾠlogistic	 ﾠ
regression	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠof	 ﾠfines,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfines	 ﾠ	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠ
variables.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ notion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ subsidiary	 ﾠ punishment	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ based	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ assumption	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ main	 ﾠ
punishment	 ﾠhas	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠdeterrence	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠTransforming	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
become	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ	 ﾠof	 ﾠimprisonment	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcredibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeterrence	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠpunishment.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠfines,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠof	 ﾠfines	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffenders.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ8	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
fines	 ﾠand	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠof	 ﾠfines	 ﾠif	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠfines	 ﾠand	 ﾠor	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠof	 ﾠfines	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
district	 ﾠcourts.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠ
judges	 ﾠto	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfines,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠis	 ﾠweak.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠof	 ﾠfines.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Table	 ﾠ8:	 ﾠLogistic	 ﾠRegression	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠFines	 ﾠand	 ﾠSubsidiary	 ﾠof	 ﾠFines	 ﾠ
Dependent	 ﾠVariable:	 ﾠSC_Fines_YN	 ﾠ Dependent	 ﾠVariable:	 ﾠSC_Fines_Subs_YN	 ﾠ
Sample(adjusted):	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ831;	 ﾠIncluded	 ﾠobservations:	 ﾠ516;	 ﾠ
Excluded	 ﾠobservations:	 ﾠ312	 ﾠ
Sample(adjusted):	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ831;	 ﾠIncluded	 ﾠobservations:	 ﾠ515;	 ﾠ
Excluded	 ﾠobservations:	 ﾠ313	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Coeff.	 ﾠ S.E	 ﾠ Prob.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Coeff.	 ﾠ S.E	 ﾠ Prob.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
C	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐8.103	 ﾠ 3.564	 ﾠ 0.023	 ﾠ C	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐8.597	 ﾠ 3.618	 ﾠ 0.018	 ﾠ
DC_Fines_YN	 ﾠ 4.195	 ﾠ 0.511	 ﾠ 0.00***	 ﾠ DC_Fines_Subs_YN	 ﾠ 4.106	 ﾠ 0.483	 ﾠ 0.00***	 ﾠ
Gender	 ﾠ 0.347	 ﾠ 0.626	 ﾠ 0.58	 ﾠ Gender	 ﾠ 0.108	 ﾠ 0.647	 ﾠ 0.867	 ﾠ
Log(Age)	 ﾠ 0.786	 ﾠ 0.777	 ﾠ 0.312	 ﾠ Log(Age)	 ﾠ 0.82	 ﾠ 0.785	 ﾠ 0.296	 ﾠ
D_Jawa	 ﾠ 0.672	 ﾠ 0.348	 ﾠ 0.054*	 ﾠ D_Jawa	 ﾠ 0.671	 ﾠ 0.351	 ﾠ 0.056*	 ﾠ
D_Greater	 ﾠJakarta	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.479	 ﾠ 0.706	 ﾠ 0.497	 ﾠ D_Greater	 ﾠJakarta	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.588	 ﾠ 0.71	 ﾠ 0.407	 ﾠ
D_SOE_empl.	 ﾠ 4.297	 ﾠ 5.801	 ﾠ 0.459	 ﾠ D_SOE_empl.	 ﾠ 4.238	 ﾠ 5.838	 ﾠ 0.468	 ﾠ
D_MP	 ﾠ 1.738	 ﾠ 4.203	 ﾠ 0.679	 ﾠ D_MP	 ﾠ 2.356	 ﾠ 4.245	 ﾠ 0.579	 ﾠ
D_Private	 ﾠ 2.41	 ﾠ 3.272	 ﾠ 0.462	 ﾠ D_Private	 ﾠ 3.186	 ﾠ 3.334	 ﾠ 0.339	 ﾠ
D_Appeal_HC	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.12	 ﾠ 0.58	 ﾠ 0.054*	 ﾠ D_Appeal_HC	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.962	 ﾠ 0.553	 ﾠ 0.082*	 ﾠ
D_JudRev	 ﾠ 0.225	 ﾠ 0.461	 ﾠ 0.626	 ﾠ D_JudRev	 ﾠ 0.376	 ﾠ 0.471	 ﾠ 0.425	 ﾠ
Log_ExplicitCost	 ﾠ 0.198	 ﾠ 0.103	 ﾠ 0.055*	 ﾠ Log_ExplicitCost	 ﾠ 0.229	 ﾠ 0.105	 ﾠ 0.030**	 ﾠ
Log_ExpCost*D_BUMN	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.158	 ﾠ 0.285	 ﾠ 0.579	 ﾠ Log_ExplicitCost*D_BUMN	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.162	 ﾠ 0.287	 ﾠ 0.572	 ﾠ
Log_ExpCost*D_MP	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.117	 ﾠ 0.218	 ﾠ 0.589	 ﾠ Log_ExplicitCost*D_MP	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.154	 ﾠ 0.22	 ﾠ 0.483	 ﾠ
Log_ExpCost*D_Private	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.114	 ﾠ 0.17	 ﾠ 0.503	 ﾠ Log_ExplicitCost*D_Private	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.152	 ﾠ 0.173	 ﾠ 0.379	 ﾠ
Mean	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvar	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.771	 ﾠ Mean	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvar	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.771	 ﾠ
S.E.	 ﾠof	 ﾠregression	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0.31	 ﾠ S.E.	 ﾠof	 ﾠregression	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0.306	 ﾠ
Sum	 ﾠsquared	 ﾠresid	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
48.032	 ﾠ Sum	 ﾠsquared	 ﾠresid	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
46.884	 ﾠ
Log	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐165.5	 ﾠ Log	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐162.4	 ﾠ
Restr.	 ﾠlog	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐277.4	 ﾠ Restr.	 ﾠlog	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐277.2	 ﾠ
LR	 ﾠstatistic	 ﾠ(11	 ﾠdf)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
223.8	 ﾠ LR	 ﾠstatistic	 ﾠ(11	 ﾠdf)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
229.5	 ﾠ
Probability(LR	 ﾠstat)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ Probability(LR	 ﾠstat)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMcFadden	 ﾠR-ﾭ‐squared	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.403	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMcFadden	 ﾠR-ﾭ‐squared	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.414	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠDecisions	 ﾠ2001-ﾭ‐2009,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠBecker	 ﾠ(1968),	 ﾠPradiptyo	 ﾠ(2007)	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠdisposals,	 ﾠfines	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠpunishment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlow	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠpayment,	 ﾠmeanwhile	 ﾠfines	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠdeterrence	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠby	 ﾠoffenders.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠU.K.,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠfine	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠ55%	 ﾠin	 ﾠEngland	 ﾠand	 ﾠWales	 ﾠ(DCA,	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdisposition	 ﾠrate	 ﾠwere	 ﾠtranslated	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
imprisonment,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠ45%	 ﾠof	 ﾠprisoners	 ﾠescaped	 ﾠ(Bowles	 ﾠand	 ﾠPradiptyo,	 ﾠ
2004).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Empirical	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠto	 ﾠcollect	 ﾠfines	 ﾠare	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠand	 ﾠmay	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠfines	 ﾠincreases.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠChapman	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2002),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollecting	 ﾠfines	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
U.K.	 ﾠis	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐third	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfines.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfine	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ£200,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠvariations	 ﾠin	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠto	 ﾠcollect	 ﾠfines	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠU.K.	 ﾠare	 ﾠhigh,	 ﾠranging	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ11	 ﾠpence	 ﾠto	 ﾠ44	 ﾠpence	 ﾠper	 ﾠpound	 ﾠ
collected	 ﾠ(DCA,	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ fines	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ credible,	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ authorities	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ adopt	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ strategy	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
transforming	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠof	 ﾠfines	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠterm	 ﾠof	 ﾠimprisonment	 ﾠperiod-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐as	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
failure	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfines	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcompensated	 ﾠby	 ﾠserving	 ﾠtime	 ﾠin	 ﾠprison.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠU.S.,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠ
25%	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ convicts	 ﾠ sentenced	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ courts	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ year	 ﾠ 2000	 ﾠ received	 ﾠ fines	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ additional	 ﾠ
penalties	 ﾠ(U.S.	 ﾠDOJ,	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠIsrael	 ﾠduring	 ﾠ1997-ﾭ‐2000,	 ﾠfines	 ﾠwere	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠpenalties	 ﾠin	 ﾠ34.7%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcases	 ﾠ(Einat,	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomplementary	 ﾠsanctions	 ﾠshows	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠfines	 ﾠin	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcredible	 ﾠsentence.	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
policing	 ﾠand	 ﾠenforcing	 ﾠfines	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthan	 ﾠother	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠsentences,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfine,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠenforcing	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicing	 ﾠit.	 ﾠAny	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠfines	 ﾠmay	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefaults.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠturn,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgives	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠinmates	 ﾠin	 ﾠprison	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmay	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠto	 ﾠprison	 ﾠovercrowded.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠfines	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠtackling	 ﾠovercrowded	 ﾠprisons.	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ8	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠin	 ﾠaffecting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
judges	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ sentence	 ﾠ offenders	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ subsidiary	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ fines.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ fines	 ﾠ credible,	 ﾠ
imprisonment	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomplementary	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfines.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠ
shows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠof	 ﾠfines	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfines	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠresult	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcredibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠfines	 ﾠ	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeterrence	 ﾠtool	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠin	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠis	 ﾠquestionable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfines	 ﾠis	 ﾠasset	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠor	 ﾠimprisonment.	 ﾠ
Based	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanticorruption	 ﾠact	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠevery	 ﾠfine	 ﾠworth	 ﾠRp	 ﾠ50	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠ($5000)	 ﾠis	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ12	 ﾠmonths	 ﾠimprisonment	 ﾠor	 ﾠapproximately	 ﾠRp4.2	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠ($420)	 ﾠper	 ﾠmonth.	 ﾠNevertheless	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠformula	 ﾠis	 ﾠnever	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠfollowed	 ﾠby	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠ
sentence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfines.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠone	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffender	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠfines	 ﾠRp	 ﾠ100	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
subsidiary	 ﾠsentences	 ﾠare	 ﾠasset	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠor	 ﾠimprisonment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ2	 ﾠmonths.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠanother	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
offender	 ﾠwas	 ﾠfines	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠamount,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠhe/she	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠsentences	 ﾠ
asset	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠor	 ﾠimprisonment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ6	 ﾠmonths.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIdeally	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
subsidiary	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠyears	 ﾠimprisonment,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
judges	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrule	 ﾠclosely.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 31	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠfines	 ﾠmore	 ﾠintensively	 ﾠthan	 ﾠother	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠand	 ﾠIsrael.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ1986,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠ81%	 ﾠof	 ﾠadult	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠin	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠwere	 ﾠordered	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
pay	 ﾠfines	 ﾠ(Tonry,	 ﾠ1997).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠfine	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠcovers	 ﾠ91%	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠdispositions	 ﾠin	 ﾠFinland	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ 1979.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ U.S.,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ fines	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ used	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ additional	 ﾠ penalty,	 ﾠ
combined	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠpenalty	 ﾠof	 ﾠeither	 ﾠimprisonment	 ﾠor	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠservice,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠsole	 ﾠsanction.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠyear	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠof	 ﾠ28,810	 ﾠconvicts	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ75	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠcounties,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ1%	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
fine	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsole	 ﾠsanction	 ﾠ(U.S.	 ﾠDOJ,	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠEinat	 ﾠ(2004)	 ﾠreported	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠIsrael	 ﾠduring	 ﾠ
1997-ﾭ‐2000	 ﾠfines	 ﾠwere	 ﾠused	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsole	 ﾠsanction	 ﾠfor	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ11%	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠineffectiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfine	 ﾠwas	 ﾠreported	 ﾠby	 ﾠGneezy	 ﾠand	 ﾠRustichini	 ﾠ(2004),	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
findings	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexperiment.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠimposing	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfine	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
unwanted	 ﾠbehaviour.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary,	 ﾠit	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepeat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbehaviour	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠfines	 ﾠwere	 ﾠimposed.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠfine	 ﾠwill	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunwanted	 ﾠbehaviour	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠscale.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthis	 ﾠargument	 ﾠseems	 ﾠappealing,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠupper	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfines	 ﾠimposed,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffenders.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Compensation	 ﾠOrder	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSubsidiary	 ﾠof	 ﾠCompensation	 ﾠOrder	 ﾠ
Further	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠto	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ pay	 ﾠ compensation	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ offences	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ committed	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ subsidiary	 ﾠ punishments	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ





SC_Compensation	 ﾠ=	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠcompensation,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ=	 ﾠYes,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ=	 ﾠOtherwise.	 ﾠ
SC_Subs_compensation=	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠcompensation,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ
Yes,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ=	 ﾠOtherwise.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ9	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠorder	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
supreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠdecrease	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠoccupations	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefendants	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
members	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparliament.	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠby	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 32	 ﾠ
parliament,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ lesser	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ likelihood	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ receive	 ﾠ compensation	 ﾠ order.	 ﾠ With	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
compensation	 ﾠorder,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠviews	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcounterparts	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠcourts.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠother	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠsignificant.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠmade	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠ
order,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠdefendants’	 ﾠage,	 ﾠgender,	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠprosecuted.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
According	 ﾠto	 ﾠAnti	 ﾠCorruption	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ20/2001,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠterm	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠregulates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
compensation.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠCriminal	 ﾠCode	 ﾠ(KUHP)	 ﾠapart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfines,	 ﾠ
judges	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠpermitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠsentenced	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishments	 ﾠ
including:	 ﾠ compensation,	 ﾠ seizure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ evidence	 ﾠ (asset),	 ﾠ court	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ offence.	 ﾠ Some	 ﾠ
prosecutors	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠprosecute	 ﾠdefendant	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthey	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsociety.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠ
courts	 ﾠ sentenced	 ﾠ defendants	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pay	 ﾠ compensation	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ
inflicted.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Similar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfines,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠorder	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeterrence	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpaid.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcredibility	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ compensation	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ achieved	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ imprisonment	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ used	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ complementary	 ﾠ
punishment	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠafford	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠorder.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠresult	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudges’	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠto	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcost	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffenders.	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
sentencing	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠorder	 ﾠwere:	 ﾠa)	 ﾠage;	 ﾠb)	 ﾠJawa;	 ﾠc)	 ﾠState-ﾭ‐
owned	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠemployee;	 ﾠand	 ﾠd)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠState-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
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Table	 ﾠ9:	 ﾠLogistic	 ﾠRegression	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Dependent	 ﾠVariable:	 ﾠSC_Compensation_YN	 ﾠ Dependent	 ﾠVariable:	 ﾠSC_Subs_Compensation	 ﾠ
Sample(adjusted):	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ831;	 ﾠIncluded	 ﾠobservations:	 ﾠ
517;	 ﾠExcluded	 ﾠobservations:	 ﾠ311+A99	 ﾠ
Sample(adjusted):	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ831;	 ﾠIncluded	 ﾠobservations:	 ﾠ
517;	 ﾠExcluded	 ﾠobservations:	 ﾠ311	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Coeff.	 ﾠ S.E	 ﾠ Prob.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Coeff.	 ﾠ S.E	 ﾠ Prob.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
C	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.934	 ﾠ 3.225	 ﾠ 0.363	 ﾠ C	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.88	 ﾠ 2.276	 ﾠ 0.206	 ﾠ
DC_Compensation_YN	 ﾠ 4.101	 ﾠ 0.362	 ﾠ 0.000***	 ﾠ
SC_Subs_Compensation
_YN	 ﾠ
0.004	 ﾠ 0.009	 ﾠ 0.662	 ﾠ
Gender	 ﾠ 0.525	 ﾠ 0.572	 ﾠ 0.359	 ﾠ Gender	 ﾠ 0.586	 ﾠ 0.431	 ﾠ 0.175	 ﾠ
Log(Age)	 ﾠ 0.318	 ﾠ 0.734	 ﾠ 0.665	 ﾠ Log(Age)	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.076	 ﾠ 0.504	 ﾠ 0.88	 ﾠ
D_Jawa	 ﾠ 0.756	 ﾠ 0.32	 ﾠ 0.018**	 ﾠ D_Jawa	 ﾠ 0.244	 ﾠ 0.22	 ﾠ 0.267	 ﾠ
D_Greater	 ﾠJakarta	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.272	 ﾠ 0.509	 ﾠ 0.012**	 ﾠ D_Greater	 ﾠJakarta	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.523	 ﾠ 0.367	 ﾠ 0.155	 ﾠ
D_SOE_empl.	 ﾠ 6.184	 ﾠ 4.574	 ﾠ 0.176	 ﾠ D_SOE_empl.	 ﾠ 2.505	 ﾠ 2.529	 ﾠ 0.322	 ﾠ
D_MP	 ﾠ 7.834	 ﾠ 3.642	 ﾠ 0.032**	 ﾠ D_MP	 ﾠ 4.333	 ﾠ 2.937	 ﾠ 0.14	 ﾠ
D_Private	 ﾠ 0.311	 ﾠ 2.789	 ﾠ 0.911	 ﾠ D_Private	 ﾠ 1.053	 ﾠ 1.961	 ﾠ 0.591	 ﾠ
D_Appeal_HC	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.922	 ﾠ 0.452	 ﾠ 0.042**	 ﾠ D_Appeal_HC	 ﾠ 1.589	 ﾠ 0.367	 ﾠ 0.00***	 ﾠ
D_JudRev	 ﾠ 0.291	 ﾠ 0.421	 ﾠ 0.49	 ﾠ D_JudRev	 ﾠ 0.359	 ﾠ 0.299	 ﾠ 0.229	 ﾠ
Log_ExplicitCost	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.023	 ﾠ 0.091	 ﾠ 0.8	 ﾠ Log_ExplicitCost	 ﾠ 0.029	 ﾠ 0.067	 ﾠ 0.665	 ﾠ
Log_ExpCost*D_BUMN	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.273	 ﾠ 0.219	 ﾠ 0.211	 ﾠ Log_ExpCost*D_BUMN	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.106	 ﾠ 0.123	 ﾠ 0.39	 ﾠ
Log_ExpCost*D_MP	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.393	 ﾠ 0.185	 ﾠ 0.034**	 ﾠ Log_ExpCost*D_MP	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.152	 ﾠ 0.15	 ﾠ 0.311	 ﾠ
Log_ExpCost*D_Private	 ﾠ 0.011	 ﾠ 0.142	 ﾠ 0.937	 ﾠ Log_ExpCost*D_Private	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.038	 ﾠ 0.1	 ﾠ 0.702	 ﾠ
Mean	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvar	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.609	 ﾠ Mean	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvar	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.472	 ﾠ
S.E.	 ﾠof	 ﾠregression	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0.339	 ﾠ S.E.	 ﾠof	 ﾠregression	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0.473	 ﾠ
Sum	 ﾠsquared	 ﾠresid	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
57.571	 ﾠ Sum	 ﾠsquared	 ﾠresid	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
112.4	 ﾠ
Log	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐193.4	 ﾠ Log	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐322.9	 ﾠ
Restr.	 ﾠlog	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐345.9	 ﾠ Restr.	 ﾠlog	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐357.5	 ﾠ
LR	 ﾠstatistic	 ﾠ(11	 ﾠdf)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
305	 ﾠ LR	 ﾠstatistic	 ﾠ(11	 ﾠdf)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
69.3	 ﾠ
Probability(LR	 ﾠstat)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ Probability(LR	 ﾠstat)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMcFadden	 ﾠR-ﾭ‐squared	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.441	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMcFadden	 ﾠR-ﾭ‐
squared	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.097	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠDecisions	 ﾠ2001-ﾭ‐2009,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ noted	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ ot	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ compensation	 ﾠ orders	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ accompanied	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ subsidiary	 ﾠ
compensation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠeither	 ﾠasset	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠor	 ﾠimprisonment.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ accompanied	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ asset	 ﾠ recovery	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ imprisonment	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ improve	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ deterrence	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompensation,	 ﾠit	 ﾠturns	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠorders	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
lenient	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidealised	 ﾠsubsidiary	 ﾠorders.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ
Conclusion	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
guidance	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠclosely,	 ﾠas	 ﾠstated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanti	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠact	 ﾠ20/2001.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ lack	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ consistency	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ determining	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ intensity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ punishments	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ sentencing	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ
weakend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeterrence	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpunishments.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠprosecution	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠanalysed	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbargaining	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheory,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
size	 ﾠof	 ﾠpie	 ﾠshrinking	 ﾠrapidly	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcases	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠprosecuted.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠonly	 ﾠcovers	 ﾠ60%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠwere	 ﾠRp	 ﾠ73.1	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ(about	 ﾠUS	 ﾠ$8.49	 ﾠbillion),	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupreme	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠwere	 ﾠRp	 ﾠ5.31	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ(about	 ﾠUS$	 ﾠ617.44	 ﾠ
million).	 ﾠ	 ﾠObviously,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdiscrepancy	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠredeemed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtaxpayers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠburden	 ﾠinflicted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorruptors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ logistic	 ﾠ regression	 ﾠ analyses	 ﾠ show	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ types	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ punishment,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ likelihood	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
sentences	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ correspond	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ inflicted	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ offenders.	 ﾠ
Instead,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠtendencies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlenient	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠoffenders	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠoccupations.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsentences	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠidiosyncratically	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠfar	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠof	 ﾠsentences	 ﾠas	 ﾠstated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnti	 ﾠCorruption	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ
20/2001.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeterrence	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnti	 ﾠCorruption	 ﾠ
Act	 ﾠ20/2001	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠKPK	 ﾠin	 ﾠerradicating	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjeopardised.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
existence	 ﾠof	 ﾠKPK	 ﾠmay	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetection	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠas	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠtend	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ sentence	 ﾠ offenders	 ﾠ idiosyncratically,	 ﾠ offenders	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ inflict	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ
receive	 ﾠlight	 ﾠsentences.	 ﾠObviously	 ﾠthis	 ﾠweakend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeterrence	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpunishment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
potentially	 ﾠjeopardise	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠerradication	 ﾠmovements.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfraction	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
Brand	 ﾠand	 ﾠPrice	 ﾠ(2000)	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠin	 ﾠanticipation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcrime,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠin	 ﾠreaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠare	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠby	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmedium-ﾭ‐high	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠusually	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
good	 ﾠ careers,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ suggest	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ private	 ﾠ solution	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ implemented	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ punishing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
offenders.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompensate	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 35	 ﾠ
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Section
/	 ﾠPart	 ﾠ Offence	 ﾠTypes	 ﾠ

















Offering	 ﾠa	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠto	 ﾠCivil	 ﾠServants	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
Bureaucrats	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ Or	 ﾠ 50	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ Or	 ﾠ 250	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Sec.	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ
Part	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ
Civil	 ﾠServants	 ﾠor	 ﾠBureaucrats	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠ
bribery	 ﾠas	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠparts	 ﾠ1A	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ1B	 ﾠ




Offering	 ﾠa	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
expert	 ﾠwitnesses	 ﾠto	 ﾠalter	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfavour	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠwho	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
bribe.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ And	 ﾠ 150	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ And	 ﾠ 750	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Sec	 ﾠ.6	 ﾠ
part	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ
Any	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠand	 ﾠexpert	 ﾠwitnesses	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
received	 ﾠa	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠas	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠ1a	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ1b	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ And	 ﾠ 150	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ And	 ﾠ 750	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Sec	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ7	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Part	 ﾠ1a	 ﾠ
Embezzlement	 ﾠof	 ﾠprocurement	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠand	 ﾠservices	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ
And	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠ 100	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ
And	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠ 350	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Sec	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ8	 ﾠ
Fraud	 ﾠand	 ﾠForgery	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Bureaucrats	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠbenefits.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ And	 ﾠ 150	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ And	 ﾠ 750	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Sec	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ
Fraud	 ﾠand	 ﾠforgery	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Bureaucrats	 ﾠin	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠdestroy	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
damage	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprosecution.	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ And	 ﾠ 50	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ And	 ﾠ 250	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Sec.	 ﾠ
10a	 ﾠ
Damaging	 ﾠand	 ﾠloosing	 ﾠany	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
administrative	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
used	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprosecution.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ And	 ﾠ 100	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ And	 ﾠ 350	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Sec.	 ﾠ11	 ﾠ
Civil	 ﾠServants	 ﾠor	 ﾠBureaucrats	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠor	 ﾠpromise	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠgovernment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
hinder	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠprofessionally.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
And	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠ 50	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
and




Receiving	 ﾠgratification	 ﾠor	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
procurement	 ﾠby	 ﾠBureaucrats,	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠstaff,	 ﾠ
expert	 ﾠwitnesses	 ﾠwho	 ﾠis	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠis	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠ




Extortion	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠby	 ﾠbureaucrats,	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ





Any	 ﾠgratification	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuspected	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠof	 ﾠbribery	 ﾠto	 ﾠbureaucrats.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ 200	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ And	 ﾠ 1000	 ﾠ Live	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 38	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ